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Abstract 
 
The existence or non-existence of procedural rules for executive rule-making in the EU is not merely a 
‘technical’ question free of constitutional value choices. This article argues that constitutional principles 
such as transparency, openness and participatory democracy highlighted by the Treaty of Lisbon constitute 
decisive normative standards for the design of administrative procedures in the EU with a considerable 
impact on substantive outcomes. We apply such principles with regard to non-legislative rule making 
procedures in the EU, highlight the salience of this discussion and argue that systematization of non-
legislative rule making procedures is needed in order to implement constitutional principles in a complex 
and plural environment.  
 
 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
The EU is a legal system which, despite in historical terms being a young structure, has 
developed and transformed itself many times. One of the ways in which the European 
Union polity has evolved in recent years is in the nature and breadth of the tasks it 
performs as well as the range of actors who perform them. As might be expected, there 
is not always a smooth link between growth in policy making powers now touching 
almost every imaginable public policy objective, on the one hand, and the institutional 
structures, decision-making procedures and constitutional framing, on the other. This 
mismatch in part results from the fact that the evolution of the EU does not always take 
place according to a specific ‘constitutional’ blueprint. More than at the national level, 
the EU’s institutional structures and decision-making procedures evolve beyond its 
formal constitutional frame, responding to the needs of the time and of specific policy 
areas, and re-shape its constitution accordingly.1 Yet, one stable characteristic of such 
developments is the integration of executive bodies of the EU and its Member States 
through diverse forms of procedural cooperation and actors such as networks of 
regulators, comitology, and agencies.2  																																																								
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Progressively, a set of constitutional values emerged both as a result of case law of the 
Court of Justice as general principles of law and in (incremental) Treaty amendments. 
This now explicitly includes the principle of democracy. This principle has above all 
shaped the EU’s institutional structures and EU lawmaking procedures. In this respect, 
the Treaty of Lisbon is the culmination of a process that has enabled the European 
Parliament to adopt “legislation” in many instances formally on equal footing with the 
Council. Arguably, rule-making outside of legislative procedures has been less influenced 
by the Union’s constitutional provisions on democracy. Little is known about how these 
provisions are translated into executive rule-making, beyond the institutional controls 
envisaged in the specific cases of delegated and implementing regulation (Articles 290 
and 291 TFEU). Nonetheless, our claim is that executive rule-making is subject to 
exactly the same constitutional values as EU lawmaking.  
 
Rulemaking processes taking place outside the formal legislative procedures produce a 
variety of different regulatory acts that may serve various functions,  such as agenda 
setting and policy definition (including, for example, resolutions of the European 
Council). Regulatory acts, in a broad sense, include legislative proposals and the 
respective preparatory acts, inter-institutional agreements, delegated and implementing 
acts, guidelines that define policy implementation. We use the term executive rulemaking in 
this article in a narrower and more specific sense as referring to the process of content 
definition of acts of general application that concretise policy or legislative options. By this 
we refer to processes that lead to the adoption of rules that potentially entail the solution, 
or the criteria of the solution, of more specific (individual) cases. As a result, the rules are 
likely to impact on the rights and legally protected interests of private persons and to 
shape acts of other public entities. Many such rules are enacted outside formalized 
procedures (e.g. information guidelines). The effects of rules may be legally relevant 
irrespective of their form, binding force and the procedures followed for their adoption. 
The Commission, agencies, comitology, standardization bodies, networks of national 
regulators and others issue guidelines and notices, designed to guide the implementation 
of EU law by Member States, EU bodies and individuals. Benchmarking and ‘open 
methods of cooperation’ that are primarily designed to coordinate policies in which the 
EU has only marginal competences are also part of the panorama of executive rule-
making, as are standards set by EU agencies or private or semi-private actors. These type 
of acts may obtain a type of quasi binding form, via legislative sanctioning or judicial 
interpretation.3 
 
The vast array of actors, forms of acts and applicable procedures make it difficult to 
assess to what extent constitutional values infuse executive rulemaking, and, more 
precisely, how general principles are complied with across the legal system. This is all the 																																																																																																																																																														
Mécanismes Communautaires et Droits Nationaux (Bruylant, 2009), at 111; E. Schmidt-Aßmann, ‘Introduction: European 
Composite Administration and the Role of European Administrative Law’, in O. Jansen and B. Schöndorf-Haubold 
(eds), The European Composite Administration (Intersentia, 2011), at 1. 
3 D. M. Trubek and L. Trubek, ‘New Governance & Legal Regulation: Complementarity, Rivalry and Transformation’, 
(2007) 13 Columbia Journal of European Law 539.  
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more so since the terrain is fragmented and rather sector-specific. Solutions to problems 
arising from the increase in powers, enlargement, ‘crises’ and other events were often 
crafted according to specific needs of single policy areas or developed creatively in order 
to address concrete problems resulting from the differing interests between EU 
institutions and Member States or resulting from inter-institutional conflict. These 
processes have tended to be predominantly result-oriented, rather than value-oriented.  
 
In the context of this dynamic and ‘living’ constitutional environment and in view of the 
highly diversified set of actors involved in executive rule-making, the aim of this special 
edition is twofold. First, it aims to contribute to the understanding of the rules that guide 
rulemaking, or, in other words, the ‘meta norms’ that shape the procedures through 
which executive rules are produced. The individual contributions focus on the rules 
about how rules are made. These can either be legislative in nature – e.g. the comitology 
regulation, policy specific legislation such as the procedural rules on state aid, anti-
dumping, banking supervision4 - or emerge from institutional practice (e.g. impact 
assessment guidelines) or judicial practice (eg general principles of law). Second, we 
defend the thesis that meta rules should be perceived as tools capable of infusing core 
constitutional principles into executive rulemaking.5 Our introduction to this special issue 
will substantiate the case for the constitutionalization of rulemaking. We argue that the 
moment has come to give effect to the constitutional promises now newly in place also 
at the level of executive rulemaking. 
 
 
II. Administrative procedures as constitutional law 
 
The existence or non-existence of procedural rules for executive rule-making in the EU 
is not merely a ‘technical’ question free of constitutional value choices. Procedures can 
have a decisive impact on substantive outcome. They provide a structure to the multiple 
contacts that an administrative entity establishes with other administrative entities, 
experts, interest groups, and persons concerned, in order to reach a decision.6 Procedures 
channel moreover the flow of information that decision-making requires and mitigate 
possible information asymmetries between relevant actors.7 Procedures accommodate 
possible conflicts that may emerge between competing interests, the pursuance of which 
is framed by legal and constitutional norms. They are techniques that allow for the 
																																																								
4 Respectively, Regulation (EC) 182/2011 of 16 February 2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council laying 
down the rules and general principles concerning mechanisms for control by Member States of the Commission’s 
exercise of implementing powers, OJ 2011 L 55/13; Council Regulation 659/1999 of 22 March 1999laying down 
detailed rules for the application of Article 93 of the EC Treaty, OJ 1999 L 83/1; Council Regulation (EC) No 
1225/2009 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Community, OJ 2009 
L 343/51;  Regulation (EU) 1095/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 
establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Securities and Markets Authority), amending Decision No 
716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Decision 2009/77/EC, OJ 2010 L 331/84.  
5 On founding principles, see A. von Bogdandy, ‘Founding Principles’, in A. von Bogdandy and J. Bast (eds), Principles 
of European Constitutional Law (Hart Publishing, 2010), at 11, 21-23. 
6 E. Schmidt-Aßmann, La Teoría General del Derecho Administrativo Como Sistema (Marcial Pons, 2003), at 358. 
7 ibid and M. McCubbins et al., ‘Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control’, (1987) 3 Journal of Law, 
Economics, and Organization 243, at 246 and 255 (referring to the US context).  
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balancing and articulation of interests that lie at the core of the administrative function 
and can concretise constitutional rights.8  
 
Information and balancing of competing interests are crucial to the choice between 
different alternatives that make specific the legislative goals in particular, but also, 
indirectly, constitutional norms.9 In other words, “by structuring the rules of the game 
[…], administrative procedures sequence agency activity, regulate its information 
collection and dissemination, limit its available choices, and define its strategic 
advantages”.10 As such they are also an instrument of political control and affect the 
range of decisions available to the decision-maker.11 Arguably proceduralisation enhances 
the rationality of decision-making and potentially enhances equality of access. In this 
sense, “the essence of the decision lies more in its preparation … than in the decision 
itself”.12 The preparatory stages of decision-making, from the moment of its being put on 
the agenda to the moment of its formal adoption, are precisely the stages that are newly 
influenced by core constitutional principles that may well be changing the rules of the 
game in a manner that is not yet fully visible or operationalised.  
 
But formal (administrative) procedures do more than influence in terms of input the 
content of decisions, they are also an essential aspect of the legal architecture within 
which the executive operates. Moreover, if we understand administration as being part of 
public law and therefore bound by constitutional norms and values, rule-making 
procedures with all their structural and institutional complexity should be subject to 
analysis as to whether they contribute to realising constitutional principles and values of 
the Union. In this sense, executive rulemaking procedures should fulfil and concretise 
the constitutional values and principles that shape the EU’s constitutional form and 
nature, and, therefore, both ground and frame the legitimate exercise of public 
authority.13 On this basis, one may argue that the values and legal principles pursued by 
the choices made by executive rule-making procedures - and a possible codification or 
non-codification thereof - are constitutional in nature. In that sense, the law of 
administrative procedures is the continuation of constitutional law by other means or, 
with other words, the concretisation of constitutional law.14  
 
Arguably, the Treaty of Lisbon buttresses an overtly constitutional approach to this 
subject in a variety of ways. First, it distinguishes and indeed names a legislative function 
and a non-legislative function. In so doing it explicitly lays down the contours of 																																																								
8 E. Schmidt-Aßmann (n 6 supra), at 163. The administrative procedure is a ‘surrogate of political process’ (R. Stewart, 
‘The Reformation of American Administrative Law’, (1975) 88 Harvard Law Review 1669.   On different conceptions on 
the function of administrative procedures, see V. Pereira da Silva, Em busca do Acto Administrativo Perdido (Livraria 
Almedina, 1996), 310-380.  
9 Directly, in the cases in which non-legislative rulemaking is adopted directly on the basis of the founding norms (the 
EU Treaties).  
10 M. McCubbins et al. (n 7 supra), at 255. 
11  ibid, at 254. 
12 J. J. G. Canotilho, ‘Procedimento Administrativo e Defesa do Ambiente’, (1991) Revista de Legislação e Jurisprudência, 
a.123, n.3798,  261-270, at 264. 
13 A. von Bogdandy (n 5 supra), at 11, 21-22. 
14 This formulation of the problem goes back to an article in German by: F. Werner, ‘Verwaltungsrecht als 
Konkretisiertes Verfassungsrecht‘, (1959) Deutsches Verwaltungsblatt, 527-533. 
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executive actors and executive tasks at the level of the EU political system. One of the 
ways it makes the EU executive function more visible is by means of delegated and 
implementing legislation as laid down in Articles 290 and 291 TFEU.15  
 
Secondly, it mainstreams very prominently general principles on the democratic 
legitimacy of the Union which extends beyond the Union representative institutions (the 
European Parliament and the Council) to include a more participatory understanding of 
democracy. The Lisbon Treaty for the first time links openness, transparency and 
participation at treaty level with democracy within the framework of “democratic 
principles”. Article 11 explictly embraces a participatory understanding of democracy, 
complementary to representative democracy (Article 10 TEU). Such a complementary 
approach appears necessary since executive rulemaking is one step removed from rule 
making by representatives in parliament due to delegation of rule-making powers to the 
executive. Our argument therefore is that supplementary forms of democracy may be 
particularly useful in infusing democracy in the respective procedures.  
 
Thirdly, by reference to the principles of transparency, openness and participation in 
Articles 10 and 11 TEU as well as to the principles of good administration in Article 41 
of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, the Lisbon Treaty explicitly lays down general 
principles that frame, or should frame the EU administration. These are accompanied by 
the legislator’s duty (“shall” in Article 298(2) TFEU) to establish provisions that 
implement such principles. The principles on democracy and on the EU administration 
overlap insofar as openness is concerned. Together, the principles on participatory 
democracy, transparency, openness and good administration define some of the essential 
normative yardsticks against which the legitimacy and lawfulness of executive rulemaking 
procedures ought to be assessed. Whether there should be any specific structured and 
potentially codified overall proceduralisation of executive rule-making, is also a question 
of concretising the constitutional principles and values of the Union.  
 
By means of introduction to the specific articles in this special edition we focus on two 
principles that, in the view of the innovative concept of democracy the Treaties 
enshrine,16 are core to the EU political system and, hence, in the view defended in this 
article, to its administration and the respective procedures: transparency and 
participation. We add a third principle – the principle of care. The principle of care is a 
principle specific to the administrative procedure. It requires public bodies to undertake 
‘full and impartial assessment of all relevant facts’ prior to decision-making.17 We argue 																																																								
15 J. Ziller, ‘Separation of Powers in the European Union’s Intertwined System of Government. A Treaty Based 
Analysis for the Use of Political Scientists and Constitutional Lawyers, (2008) LXXIII Il politico 133, at 138, 147-152; K. 
Lenaerts and M. Desomer, ‘Towards a Hierarchy of Legal Acts in the European Union? Simplification of Legal 
Instruments and Procedures’, (2005) 11 European Law Journal 744, at 750.   
16 A. von Bogdandy, ‘The European Lesson for International Democracy: The Significance of Articles 9-12 EU Treaty 
for International Organizations’, (2012) 23 European Law Journal 315. 
17 See e.g. Case C-310/04 Spain v Council [2006] ECR I-7285, paras 123, 130: ‘[a] proper study of the effects of that 
reform on the profitability of cotton production requires an examination of the consequences the reform is liable to 
produce for ginning undertaking situated in the production regions.’ See also: Case T-24/90 Automec v Commission 
[1992] ECR II-2223, para 79. The CJEU now has established case law reviewing the legality of a measure under the 
principle of proportionality by establishing whether there is proof of the respect of the duty of care: Case C-176/09 
	 6 
that the notions of ‘full’ and ‘impartial’ assessment of ‘all relevant facts’ have a 
participatory dimension, insofar as they require the inclusion of diverse views arising 
from the general public and all parties which identify themselves as having an interest in 
a regulatory matter.   
 
We highlight the gap between the normative implications of these principles and the 
current legislative and judicial rules. Our aim is to explore the meaning of the relevant 
Treaty rules as normative yardsticks of proceduralisation. 
 
 
III. Access to documents as a meta-norm for EU rule-makers  
 
A. The province of transparency: from administration to constitution 
In the literature openness and transparency are often used interchangeably and without a 
great deal of conceptual precision. 18 It is possible however to conceptualise transparency 
as one component of openness and participation as the other. 19 Transparency can be 
defined as the ability to observe decision-making and rule-making processes whereas 
participation refers to the opportunity to participate in these decision-making and rule-
making processes. Transparency can include access to documents only,20 the actual 
availability of documents,21 or even information in a more general sense that reveals the 
thinking behind a decision or the way in which a decision is made.22 But openness is the 
broader concept that is defined for our purposes as the extent to which citizens can 
monitor and influence legislative and executive processes through access to information 
and access to decision-making arenas.23  
 
Prior to the Treaty of Amsterdam, transparency-related measures were viewed as a 
matter for the affected institutions themselves, to do with their internal functioning and 
hence falling under their respective rules of procedure. This essentially self-regulatory 
approach meant that initially the tendency was to view the principle of public access to 
documents as at most a voluntarily assumed specific principle of administrative law that 
has gradually, through the medium of case law, acquired some procedural flesh and 
substance.24 The focus in these early years was on gradually constructing a right of access 																																																																																																																																																														
Luxembourg v EP and Council [2011] ECR I-nyr of 12 May 2011, para 65 ; Case C-58/08 Vodafone and Others [2010] ECR 
I-nyr of 8 June 2010, para 55. 
18 See for example, M. O’Neill, ‘The Rights of Access to Community-held Documentation as a General Principle of 
EC law’, (1998) 4 European Public Law 403; P. Settembri,‘Transparency and the EU Legislator: ‘Let he Who is Without 
Sin Cast the First Stone’, ’ (2005) 43 Journal of Common Market Studies 637. 
19 See further, A. Meijer et al., ‘Open Government: Connecting Vision and Voice’, International Review of the Administrative 
Science, special issue, 78 (1), March 2012, 10 - 29.  
20 See further, U. Öberg, ‘Public Access to Documents After the Entry into Force of the Amsterdam Treaty: Much 
Ado About Nothing?’, (1998) 2 European Union online papers. 
21 See for example, G. Brandsma, D. Curtin and A. Meijer, ‘How Transparent are EU ‘Comitology’ Committees in 
Practice?’,  (2008)14 European Law Journal 819. 
22 See, D. Stasavage, ‘Open-door or Closed-door? Transparency in Domestic and International Bargaining’ ,  (2004) 58 
International Organization 667.  
23 See further, A.Meijer et al. (note 19 supra). The following draws on D. Curtin and J. Mendes, “Transparence et 
Participation: des Principes Démocratiques pour l'Administration de l'Union Européenne” Revue Française 
d’Administration Publique, 2011/1 (no 137-138), 101. 
24 On this case law see further, D. Curtin, ‘Citizens’ Fundamental Right of Access to Information: an Evolving Digital 
Passepartout?’,  (2002) 37 Common Market Law Review 7.  
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by the public to certain categories of document held by the three decision-making 
institutions (Commission, Council and the European Parliament). The General Court 
and the Court of Justice effectively built a body of case law that on the whole kept 
pressure on the institutions to behave fairly and to devise adequate systems of scrutiny. 
They tended in the early case law to interpret the scope of the legal provisions (decisions 
by the institutions based on their internal rules of procedure) rather broadly so that, for 
example, specific institutional arrangements did not operate to reduce the reach of the 
access to documents provisions.25 The technique of legal interpretation used by the 
Courts during this foundational period involved a type of teleological reasoning which 
placed the initial Code of Conduct adopted by two decision-making institutions in the 
context of its broader democratic purpose.26 The Courts tended to emphasize the 
underlying purpose of access to documents as resting on general notions of public 
control of the activities of public institutions. Thus, the Courts developed what can be 
termed a constitutional perspective on access to documents provisions avant la lettre. Only 
later were these ‘rights’ given an explicitly constitutional foundation, first in the Treaty of 
Amsterdam, then in the Charter on Fundamental Rights and later in the Lisbon Treaty 
(Article 15 TFEU). 
 
This specifically ‘legal’ approach culminated with the adoption of a new and binding legal 
instrument, Regulation 1049/2001 that entered into force on 3 December 2001.27  
Although, in accordance with then Article 255 EC, EU level legislation granted a public 
right of access to the documents of only the three main law-making institutions (the 
Commission, the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament), the access to 
documents legislation was applied voluntarily by a wide variety of other institutions and 
(quasi-) autonomous actors.28 The Treaty of Lisbon in Article 15(3), TFEU consolidates 
this position in practice with the explicit treaty level provision of the right of access to 
documents of the “Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, whatever their 
medium’, very much in line with the previous Article 42 of the Charter on Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union. 
  
The legal-constitutional approach is relatively solidly anchored in legal texts, including, as 
we have seen, at the most fundamental level of the Treaty on European Union in its 
Lisbon version. The provisions on public access to documents clearly have caused 
changes by giving citizens a tool to obtain the documents they wish to obtain, albeit with 
																																																								
25 See further, for example, Case T-194/94, Carvel and Guardian Newspapers v Council [1995] ECR II-2765 and Case 
T-174/95, Svenska Journalistfo’rbundet (Swedish Union of Journalists) v Council [1998] ECR II-2289. 
26 See further, D. Curtin, ‘Betwixt and Between: Democracy and Transparency in the Governance of the EU’, in J. 
Winter, D. Curtin, A. Kellerman, B. de Witte (eds), Reforming the Treaty on European Union (Kluwer Law International , 
1996), at 95. 
27 See, Regulation (EC) 1049/2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission 
documents, OJ 2001, at 43. See further, European Commission, ‘Green paper: public access to documents held by the 
institutions of the European Community. A Review’, COM (2007) 185 final (18 May 2007). See too, Commission staff 
working document, report on the outcome of the public consultation on the review of Regulation (EC) 1049/2001 
regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents, SEC (2008) 29/2 (16 January 
2008). 
28 See further, J. Helikoski and P. Leino, ‘Darkness at the Break of Noon: the Case Law on Regulation No. 1049/2001 
on Access to Documents’ ,  (2006) 43 Common Market Law Review 735.  
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a considerable and significant time lag.29 Access to documents has acquired the status of 
a rather fundamental norm in the EU legal and constitutional system. At the same time it 
has however also in recent years become highly ‘legalized’ with many of the most crucial 
issues as to the meaning of the exceptions, the relationship with national legal provisions 
and the relationship with other legal rights that also enjoy a fundamental status (e.g. 
privacy and data protection). The Court(s) in Luxembourg who were once seen as the 
‘unsung hero’ of those seeking to open up the inner institutional workings of the EU 
have come under fire at times for what is perceived to be an unnecessarily generous 
interpretation of the scope and meaning of several key exceptions to the legal right.30 The 
courts are both restrictive and generous at more or less the same time with little 
predictability as to how they will interpret the scope of the exceptions. In addition there 
is some attempt to turn back the clock by the Commission in particular in the ongoing 
revision of the access to documents regulation. 31 
 
The Court’s approach is underpinned by the complementary work of the Ombudsman.32 
As arbiter of maladministration, the Ombudsman has an interest in transparency as good 
governance and the Code of good administrative behaviour helps to promote 
transparency through the formulation of policies as rules and guidelines.33 Indeed, the 
work of the Ombudsman helps to move the understanding of transparency in the EU 
context away from an individual and passive focus on the legal right of every citizen to 
have access to certain documents to a much broader and pro-active duty of the EU 
executive to ensure that information about its policies and actions are made genuinely 
accessible. The EO's inquisitorial procedures, allow him to access administrative files and 
also to make files public during the proceedings and are perhaps the most potent 
machinery for opening windows on public information yet devised. Thus the 
constitutionally guaranteed right of access to the Ombudsman acts as an important 
catalyst for openness and transparency.34 
 
Overall, it is difficult to assess the effect of these practices in the specific realm of the 
EU executive rule-makers, as distinguished from the EU legislator. However, in recent 
years the Commission in particular has set up several different specific document registers 
including such instruments as the ‘Register on Expert Groups’,35 as well as the 
Commission’s register of interest representatives.36 These include a very detailed 																																																								
29 See further, L. Cotino, ‘Theory and Reality of Public Access to EU Information’ , in 
D. Curtin, A. Kellermann and S. Blockmans (eds), The EU Constitution: the Best Way Forward? (Kluwer, 2005), at 233.  
30 See further, J. Helliskoski and P. Leino (n 28 supra). 
31 See further, F. Maini, J. Villeneuve and M. Pasquier,  ‘Less is More’? The Commision Proposal on Access to EU 
Documents and the Proper Limits of Transparency’, Revue Franc ̧aise d'Administration Publique, 2011/1 (no 137-138), 155-
170. 
32 For an overview of the activities of the Ombudsman in this respect see, I. Harden, ‘The European Ombudsman’s 
Efforts to Increase Openness in the Union’, in V. Deckmyn (ed), Increasing transparency in the European Union (European 
Institute of Public Administration, 2002), at 123, in particular at 130 et seq. 
33 European Ombudsman, European Code of Good Administrative Behaviour, available in the latest version at 
<http://www.euro-ombudsman.eu.int/ >.  
34 See too, C. Harlow, ‘Transparency in the European Union: Weighing the Public and Private Interest’, in J. Wouters, 
L. Verhey and P. Kiiver (eds), European Constitutionalism Beyond Lisbon (Intersentia, 2009), at 209. 
35 See, <http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regexpert/index.cfm>. 
36 See, Commission Register of Interest Representatives, 
https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/transparency/regrin/welcome.do?locale=en>. See, the critical initial report by ALTER-
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‘comitology’ register37 and other specific web sites by the various Directorate Generals as 
well as a specific register on expert groups. All of these specific registers and web sites 
relate more generally to the province of the administration in a general sense and may 
include some documents of a more internal nature (for example minutes of committee 
meetings, meeting documents and minutes of meetings as well as draft decisions). They 
are particularly relevant to understand decision-making processes supporting the 
enactment of implementing – administrative – rulemaking.  
 
B The normative gaps 
 
Transparency should ideally enable the public to reconstruct a rule-making process and 
also ultimately be in a better position to hold the rule makers to account for their 
decisions or failings. The mere existence of a passive right of access to documents is 
merely a very initial perspective from which it is possible to see a hazy and distant vista 
of democratic principles applicable to the EU executive as a whole. To bring this vista 
more into focus requires both an active attitude and practice of access to information by 
the administration itself as well as the active input in one way or another of both 
interested stakeholders and the wider public, depending on the subject matter and remit 
of the rule making and administration in question.  
 
Viewed from this perspective EU practices of transparency often do not comply with 
these standards. Considerable reliance has been placed on the legal road by those seeking 
to draw back further the veil of secrecy that hangs over decision-making at the EU level. 
This has provided relatively solid albeit limited guarantees of transparency, in particular 
given the powers of review of the Courts and of the Ombudsman. However, although 
these efforts, and the practices of the EU institutions, have clearly provided the public 
with more information on EU rule-making than before, it does not necessarily provide it 
with all the tools to reconstruct a decision-making process, in particular in the 
administrative realm. The increased transparency of the comitology committees is a case 
in point. Although there is now neatly organized information available on comitology 
committees that is accessible on-line, it is still impossible to fully understand discussions 
in a meeting given its limited and often superficial nature.38 
 
These caveats notwithstanding, it is undeniable that transparency allows for an 
“administrative style more open and transparent, and, as such, more adequate to the 
democratic principle and the rule of law”.39 In this sense, transparency is not to be 
understood as an additional, autonomous source of legitimacy. Arguably, this is also not 
																																																																																																																																																														
EU (The Alliance for Lobbying Transparency and Ethics Regulation), Commission Lobby Register Fails Transparency 
Test, <http://www.alter-
eu.org/en/system/files/publications/Commission+Register+Fails+Transparency+Test.pdf>. 
37 See, <http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regcomitology/faq_en.htm>.  
38 G. Brandsma, D. Curtin and A. Meijer, ‘How Transparent are EU ‘Comitology’ Committees in Practice?’,  (2008) 14 
European Law Journal 819. 
39 E. Schmidt-Aßmann, ‘La Legitimación de la Administración Como Concepto Jurídico’, (1993) Documentación 
Administrativa 163, at 211. 
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the way it is framed in the Lisbon Treaty.40 Transparency (and participation) are rather 
factors improving the democratic quality of decisions.41 Transparency is an essential 
condition to effective participation but at the same time both transparency and 
participation together are necessary to constitute a genuinely open administration. A 
political system will only be ‘open’ in a democratic perspective if it engages citizens to 
participate actively in the decision-making processes, whether as a basis for opinion 
formation for e.g. voting or for staying in touch with decision-makers. For the latter 
purpose, the mere availability of documents (information) on its own is not sufficient42.  
 
Precisely because, there is more to democracy in the EU administration than the mere 
existence of transparency practices, law is likely to have a significant contribution to 
make in adjusting current procedures to match some of the normative standards required 
by an ideal of democracy. The role of law in solidifying transparency in the EU political 
system is indicative of its potential contribution to tackle the democratic shortcomings of 
institutional practices. Law does not however provide a panacea for the problems that 
have arisen in practice. To conclude, the current rules and practices of transparency can 
support a vista of democratic principles for the EU executive, but the institutional 
practices on which Article 11 TEU relies display significant limitations in view of its 
purported democratic ideals.  
 
 
IV Participation as a meta-norm for EU rule-makers 
 
A The province of participation  
Participation has manifold meanings and can serve a variety of different functions: it can 
be a means of voicing and defending affected rights and legally interests, of improving 
efficiency of regulatory processes and policy outputs), and it can be a source of 
democratic input into decision-making. In EU law, in the form of the right to be heard, it 
is one of the general principles of law, established as such in the case law of the Courts 
and enshrined in sector legislation.43 In institutional practice, participation has been a 
characteristic of EU policy-making decision-making since the beginning of integration, 
which acquired renewed relevance as a ‘principle of good governance’ in the follow up of 
the White Paper on Governance.44 In this sense, participation has been a constitutive 
																																																								
40 This is supported by the interplay between Article 10 and Article 11 of the TEU, and in particular by Article 10(1). 
See too B. Kohler-Koch, ‘Zivilgesellschaftliche Partizipation: Zugewinn an Demokratie Oder Pluralisierung der 
Europaischen Lobby?, in B. Kohler-Koch and C. Quittkat, Die Entzuberung Partizipativer Demokratie, Zur Rolle der 
Zivilgesellschaft bei der Demokratisierung von EU Governance (Campus Verlag, 2010). 
41 E. Schmidt-Aßmann (n 39 supra), at 212. 
42 See, T. Hueller, ‘Assessing EU strategies for publicity’, (2007) 14 Journal of European Public Policy 563; and D. 
Naurin, Deliberation Behind Closed Doors: Transparency and Lobbying in the European Union (ECPR Press, 2007). 
43 See, among many others, Case 17/74, Transocean Marine Paint Association v Commission [1974] ECR 1063; Case 
234/84, Belgium v Commission [1986] ECR 2263, para 27; Case C-135/92, Fiskano v Commission [1994] ECR I-2885, para 
39; Case T-260/94, Air Inter v Commission [1997] ECR II-997, para 60. See also Article 41, para 2, sub a of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights. See, further, E. Barbier de la Serre, ‘Procedural Justice in the European Community 
Case-law Concerning the Rights of the Defence: Essentialist and Instrumental Trends’, (2006) 12 European Public Law 
225. 
44 Commission Communication ‘An open and structured dialogue between the Commission and special interest 
groups’ (Communication 93/C63/02, of 12 of Dec. 1992, SEC/92/2272 final) available at 
<http://www.ec.europa.eu/civil_society/interest_groups/index_en.htm>). European Governance. A White Paper’, 
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feature of the EU polity long before the Lisbon Treaty gave it the status of a democratic 
principle. Yet, one may argue that Article 11 TEU can hardly be seen merely as a 
continuity of previous institutional practices. Rather, it brings about a normative shift 
regarding the role of participation in the EU.45  
The provisions of Article 11 TEU are, to some extent, open-ended. However, Article 11 
also defines normative standards binding on the institutions.46 This ambivalence is well 
expressed in Article 11(1) TEU. It explicitly gives leeway to choose the appropriate 
means to make the participation of citizens and representative associations effective; at 
the same time, it defines that there needs to be a ‘public exchange of views’, ‘in all areas of 
Union action.’ In addition, in one reading of Article 11 TEU, there are normative 
implications following from participation as a principle of democracy. This provision, 
read in conjunction with Articles 9 and 10(3) TEU, grounds a principle of democratic 
citizen participation that requires focusing on the citizen and on its relationships with the 
Union.47 Rulemaking procedures that intend to concretise participation as a principle of 
democracy need to ensure equality – both in access and in treatment – and transparency. 
Both are conditions upon which the democratic value of participation depends.48 Forms 
of participation that fall short of minimum democratic guarantees should be interpreted 
as having a different purpose (e.g. ensuring responsiveness of regulation). They may have 
a valuable instrumental function in the policy process, but they cannot be understood as 
enhancing the democratic legitimacy of decisions of the Union. 
Where does executive rulemaking stand when seen in the light of Article 11 TEU? 
Executive rulemaking does not have the democratic legitimacy of legislative procedures, 
but has a relevant impact both on legislative choices, via the executive activity that 
precedes legislative acts (e.g. opinions and legislative proposals), and on the 
concretization of those legislative choices, via delegation and implementation (in a broad 
sense). It is, at the same time, the level of public action of the Union where procedural 
standards of participation have been to a great extent overlooked by the Commission, by 
the Court of Justice and by the Parliament.  
 
B Participation and executive rulemaking: The normative gaps 
The Commission’s consultation standards 
When in 2002 the Commission published its Communication on principles and 
minimum standards of consultation, significantly, one of the policy choices was to 
exclude from its scope of application non-legislative initiatives not covered by impact 
assessment procedures.49 Following an emerging ‘case-by-case’ practice of conducting 																																																																																																																																																														
COM (2001) 428 final, Brussels, 25.7.2001; See further, J. Mendes, Participation in European Union Rulemaking: A Rights-
Based Approach (Oxford University Press, 2011), Chapter 3, Sections 3.1 and 3.2.  
45 J. Mendes, ‘Participation and the Rule of Law After Lisbon: A Legal View on Article 11 TEU’, (2011) 48 Common 
Market Law Review 1854. Generally, on the significance of Articles 9-12 TEU, see von Bogdandy (n 16 supra), 318-319. 
46 P. Craig, The Lisbon Treaty (Oxford University Press, 2011).  J. Mendes (n 45 supra), at 1868. 
47 J. Mendes (n 45 supra), at 1862.  
48 ibid. This claim is buttressed by the Draft recommendation of the European Ombudsman in his inquiry into 
complaint 2558/2009/(TN)DK against the European Commission, which stresses equality and transparency as pillars 
of participatory democracy (pt. 9). 
49  Communication from the Commission: Towards a reinforced culture of consultation and dialogue- General 
principles and minimum standards for consultation of interested parties by the Commission (COM(2002)704), 11 
December 2002, at 15.  
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impact assessments on certain non-legislative measures, the 2009 Impact Assessment 
Guidelines confirmed the widening of the scope of impact assessment procedures to 
‘certain implementing measures (so called ‘comitology’ items) which are likely to have 
significant impacts’.50 The respective consultations are subject to the 2002 standards. This 
still excludes the application of consultation standards from a large share of executive 
rulemaking – all those not subject to impact assessment procedures.51 Even where 
consultation procedures are conducted at this level of regulation, and depending on the 
Commission’s assessment of their ‘significant impact,’52 many are not bound by the self-
imposed rules of the Commission. This is problematic, both from a political and legal 
point of view.53 Consultation standards are one of the main instruments directed at 
guaranteeing inclusiveness, transparency and accountability of participation. These values 
have, at least, a ‘democratic echo’ and are generally excluded from participation in non-
legislative rulemaking. If the Commission intends to use its 2002 consultation standards 
to give effect to Article 11 TEU, their scope would need to be revised possibly beyond 
what the Commission currently envisages.54 But also the content of the Commission’s 
principles and standards may need to be revised in light of Article 11 TEU. Their 
shortcomings, when assessed against the standards of Article 11, have been forcefully 
highlighted by the Ombudsman in a case of maladministration pertaining to the 
publication of consultation documents only in one official language.55  
The interpretative role of the Court 
The Court of Justice has refrained from imposing participation rights or duties of 
consultation in rulemaking procedures whenever these are not explicitly specified either 
in a Treaty or in a legislative provision. The leading judgment in this matter remains 
Atlanta.56 While the arguments the Court invoked therein related to ‘a Community 
legislative process,’57 the Court did not hesitate to deny participation rights also with 
regard to non-legislative procedures when at stake were acts of general scope.58 In 1996, 																																																								
50 Commission, ‘Impact Assessment Guidelines’, 15 Jan. 2009, SEC(2009) 92, at 6 (available at 
<http://ec.europa.eu/governance/impact/commission_guidelines/docs/iag_2009_en.pdf>), emphasis added. 
51 The 2009 Guidelines preceded the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty and, hence, the creation of the category of 
delegated acts. However, at first sight, there are no reasons to support a literal interpretation of the guidelines, 
according to which these acts would be a priori excluded from impact assessment procedure. An example confirms 
this: by legislative determination, the Commission needs to assess the impact of delegated acts adopted on the basis of 
Directive 2010/30/EU of 19 May 2010 on the indication by labelling and standard product information of the 
consumption of energy and other resources by energy-related products, O.J. L 153/1; Art. 10(3)(b)). See further 
Alemmano, Meweuse in this issue. 
52 On the lack of transparency of the Commission’s selection of initiatives that undergo impact assessments, see 
European Court of Auditors, ‘Impact Assessments in the EU institutions: do they support decision making?’, Special 
Report No. 3/2010, at 28 and 46. 
53 See, however, Alemanno and Meuwese in this issue.  
54 Commission Communication, ‘Smart Regulation in the European Union’, COM(2010)543 final, Brussels, 8.10.2010, 
at 3. See also J. Mendes (n 45 supra), 1869-1870. 
55 Draft recommendation of the European Ombudsman concerning his inquiry into complaint 640/2011/AN against 
the European Commission (24 November 2011). 
56 Case T-521/93, Atlanta and others v Council and Commission [1996] ECR II-1707, para 70 to 74; Case C-104/97 P, 
Atlanta and others v Commission and Council [1999] ECR I-6983, para 35 to 38. 
57 Case C-104/97 P, Atlanta and others v Commission and Council [1999] ECR I-6983, para 70. 
58 Case T-122/96, Federazione Nazionale del Commercio Oleario (Federolio) v Commission [1997] ECR II-1559, para 
75; Case T-199/96, Laboratoires pharmaceutiques Bergaderm SA and Jean-Jacques Goupil v Commission [1998] ECR 
II-2805, para 50 and 58; Case T-13/99, Pfizer Animal Health SA v Council [2002] ECR II-3305 para 487 and Case T-
70/99, Alpharma Inc. v Council [2002] ECR II-3495, para 388. See Türk in this issue and, further, J. Mendes (n 44 
supra),  193-229.  
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when the first Atlanta judgment was given, issues of democracy – in particular, of sources 
of democracy alternative to representation – were already a salient topic in the political 
agenda. The Court apparently chose not to enter this debate. Instead, it endorsed a strict 
legal view on the democratic foundations of the then European Community, as 
exclusively based on representative democracy and on the participation of Economic and 
Social Committee in rulemaking.  
The same stance is considerably more conditioned now, in view of Article 11 TEU.59 The 
recognition or otherwise of participation rights, or of legally enforceable rules of 
participation, may require a distinction between the realm of political participation and 
that of participation grounded in legal reasons, as Türk defends in this issue. Arguably, 
the Courts should abstain from imposing participation rights in policymaking procedures 
or requirements of public-interest participation, where no overriding legal principle 
would require it. Drawing the line between these two worlds, also in the realm of 
executive rulemaking, defining when there is a shift from the political to the legal, is no 
easy task.60 However, it might be one the Court will be faced with in view of the looser 
requirements of standing of Article 263(4) TFEU.  
Legislative procedural rules 
Hitherto, the EU legislator has not been active in enshrining procedural standards of 
participation in non-legislative procedures, in contrast with its position regarding the 
decision-making procedures followed by the Member States when implementing EU 
law.61 Article 11 TEU may determine a change in this respect. Arguably the task of 
concretising the normative standards of Article 11 TEU in instances of non-legislative 
rulemaking ought to be primarily in the hands of the legislator. Law may not the only 
means of giving effect to Article 11 TEU.62 Yet, the choice of when and how 
participation is appropriate in given regulatory processes, in order to give effect to Article 
11 TEU, is a fundamental political choice and one which the legislator is best placed to 
make, given its democratic legitimacy (Article 10(2) TEU). Ultimately, such choice will 
define the degree of participatory democracy imprinted to EU rulemaking procedures in 
concretisation of the Treaties, in particular, in view of the complementarity Articles 10 
and 11 TEU establish. Whether via a general act – possibly based on Article 298(2) 
TFEU – or via sector legislation, the legislator ought to make explicit the choices on how 
to concretise the democratic provisions of the Treaty with regard to non-legislative 
procedures, given their potential impact on legislative choices. Although the Parliament 
and the Council are dependent on the Commission’s initiative, it is fully within their 
scope either to make use of Articles 225 and 241 TFEU (to trigger a legislative initiative) 
or to introduce amendments to the Commission’s proposals in this regard. 
 
 
 																																																								
59 See J. Mendes (n 45 supra), 1873-1875.  
60 P. Craig, EU Administrative Law (Oxford University Press, 2012), 294-298 and the different proposals of Türk, in this 
issue [at 5 and 6] and J. Mendes (n 44 supra), 355-362. 
61 P. Craig (n 60 supra), 298-299. 
62 P. Craig, The Lisbon Treaty (Oxford University Press, 2011); J. Mendes (n 45 supra).  
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V. Procedural Principles Supporting Participatory Democracy 
 
It arises from much of the discussion above on administrative procedural law as 
concretization of constitutional principles, especially when thought of in the context of a 
system of both representative and participatory democracy, that a key component of 
administrative procedure law necessary to realize these constitutional principles is related 
to gathering, use and distribution of information. In the same vein, participation has 
certain procedural pre-conditions that need to be fulfilled to be exercised. Many of the 
procedural principles ensuring the functions of participatory democracy and information 
are linked to notions of good administration and with it to the overarching umbrella 
principle of the rule of law.  
 
In this respect, one of the central innovations of the case law of the Court of Justice with 
respect to the definition of overarching principles also applicable to  rule making has 
been the distillation from the umbrella principle of the rule of law, what is often called 
the ‘duty of care’.63 In a different formulation, also used by the Court, the principle of the 
duty of care requires public bodies to undertake ‘full and impartial assessment of all 
relevant facts’ prior to decision making. The ‘duty of care’ is therefore sometimes also 
referred to as the ‘duty of diligent and impartial examination’.64  Being able, as an 
administration, to fully and impartially examine and assess relevant facts requires 
acquiring such information. The notions of ‘full’ and ‘impartial’ assessment of ‘all 
relevant facts’ could ground an obligation to enter into broad consultation and hearing. 
This is a normative argument that is not currently reflected in the case law of the Courts. 
Yet, arguably, a full investigation of all relevant facts would require giving the possibility 
to potentially interested parties to notify their views. Properly framed participatory 
procedures could also be able to contribute to the impartiality of the administration by 
providing a broad range of information to be taken into account. In this, the above 
mentioned transparency requirements for interest groups participating in such 
procedures might be a valuable tool to also protect the impartiality of the administration 
when engaging in executive rule making. Consultation and hearing are in that sense 
principles contributing to the realization of democratic participation by the citizens. 
However, for this purpose, full information about pending measures is necessary. In EU 
case law, not surprisingly, the duty of care is closely linked with the right to a fair hearing 
which carries with it the rights of access to the relevant information held by the public 
body.65 Finally, compliance with the duty of care needs to be demonstrated through 
reasoning of an act. Only a sufficiently reasoned decision will indicate compliance with 
																																																								
63 See, in particular, Cases T-211/02 Tieland Signal Ltd v Commission [2002] ECR II-3781, para 37; Case T-54/99 
max.mobil v Commission [2002] ECR II-313, paras 48–51; Case C-449/98 P IECC v Commission [2001] ECR I-3875, para 
45; Case T-24/90 Automec v Commission [1992] ECR II-2223, para 79; Case T-95/96 Gestevisión Telecinco v Commission 
[1998] ECR II-3407, para 53; Joined cases 142/84 and 156/84 BAT and Reynolds v Commission [1987] ECR 4487, para 
20.  
64 See, in particular, Case C-269/90 Technische Universität München v Hauptzollamt München- Mitte [1991] ECR I-5469, para 
14. 
65 H-P. Nehl, Principles of Administrative Procedure in EC Law (Hart Publishing, 1999), 103–105.  See on the principle of 
the equality of arms Case T-306/01 Ahmed Ali Yusuf [2005] ECR II-3533, para 72 with many further references in the 
case law. 
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the duty of care and the standards of investigation.66 This reasoning enables ex post review 
to discern which interests were taken into account to which degree and why, thereby 
potentially contributing to the impartiality of decision-making.  
 
For these reasons, the duty of care is also now regarded as one of the general principles 
protected under the umbrella notion of ‘good administration.’67 Good administration, 
initially developed exclusively in the case law of the Courts, has been cautiously and 
partially codified in Article 41 CFR. Article 41 CFR contains the notions of hearing, 
information and reasoning of a decision.  The constitutional principles discussed in this 
context, thus establish framework-rules on how much information needs to be collected 
prior to decision making and of which quality. Given that the realization of constitutional 
norms in the EU context is not a value free undertaking, such collection of information 
cannot be based on certain parties to a procedure only. We would submit that in view of 
the principles of transparency and openness of the EU legal system discussed above, the 
duty of care must be interpreted also in a way which requires the inclusion of diverse 
views arising from the general public and all parties which identify themselves as having 
an interest in a regulatory matter. 
 
The duty to investigate fully and impartially all aspects of a case prior to taking a decision 
can, for example, encompass the analysis of its potential impact on other collateral 
aspects.68 Courts have so far reviewed this mainly in the context of their review of the 
principle of proportionality. In a series of recent cases, the Courts have confirmed that 
an administration can demonstrate its compliance with its duty of care and argue the 
proportionality of its action when providing for reasoned impact assessment of a 
planned measure. This point was initially made by Advocate General Sharpston.69 The CJ 
now has established case law reviewing the legality of a measure under the principle of 
proportionality – i.e. the fact that no less onerous measures could have been employed to 
reach a policy goal – by establishing whether there is proof of the respect of the duty of 
care by means of an impact assessment report drafted prior to the entry into force of the 
of a measure.70  																																																								
66 Joined Cases T-371 and 394/94 British Airways and others and British Midlands Airways v Commission [1998] 
ECR II-2405, para 95. 
67 Also protected by Art. 41(1) CFR (Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union). C-248/99 P Monsanto 
[2002] ECR I-1, paras 91-93. However, the Court did not annul the Commission’s contested act on that basis, since it 
concluded that the appellant had not established that the decision at issue was not actually, in that specific case, 
adopted in disregard of the principle of sound administration and the duty of care.  
68 See e.g. the situation in Case C-310/04 Spain v Council [2006] ECR I-7285, paras 123, 130: ‘[a] proper study of the 
effects of that reform on the profitability of cotton production requires an examination of the consequences the 
reform is liable to produce for ginning undertaking situated in the production regions.’ 
69 Sharpston AG, in a matter concerning a Spanish support scheme for cotton producers, referred to the obligation of 
the institutions to explore the element of a decision fully, prior to taking a decision, as the obligation to undertake an 
‘impact study’. This obligation is linked to the principle of proportionality insofar as it imposes ‘an obligation on 
Community institutions at least to satisfy themselves that the proposed measures are prima facie adequate to attain the 
legitimate aims pursued’. Opinion of Sharpston AG in Case C-310/04 Spain v Council [2006] ECR I-7285, para 80. The 
violation of the duty to care by the institutions was so severe that they were criticized as appearing arbitrary: ‘In the 
absence of any impact study, certain choices made by the Commission and the Council appear arbitrary’ (para 94). 
70 Case C-176/09 Luxembourg v EP and Council [2011] ECR I-nyr of 12 May 2011, para 65 ; Case C-58/08 Vodafone and 
Others [2010] ECR I-nyr of 8 June 2010, para 55; Case C-343/09 Afton Chemical [2010] ECR I-nyr of 8 July 2010, paras 
29, 36, 57. In Afton, the court points out that this line of reasoning holds even though the impact assessment 
undertaken by the Commission was not binding on the Parliament or Council taking a legislative decision based on the 
Commission proposal. A similar reasoning might apply if the Commission has discretion to decide on the basis of an 
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Given the EU’s fast-paced constitutional developments, the gap between an explicit 
requirement of impact assessment and a clear statement that such assessment is 
incomplete without the possibility of participation should soon be closed. This can be 
done through the medium of case law of the Courts or by design: the creation of 
administrative procedures taking seriously the rights of individuals and the obligations of 
the executive branch of power in the EU. 
VI. Constitutional Principles and Executive Rule-Making Procedures  
 
The discussion of the relevance of constitutional principles for structuring executive rule 
making procedures would remain rather abstract if it were not linked to a more in-depth 
understanding of rule making procedures. Executive rule making as the object of 
analysis, is, as we have discussed in the introduction to this article a dynamic matter. It is 
undertaken in the context of a rapidly evolving complexity of actors, both public and 
private, organized on the European level and in the Member States.71 Yet, some 
systematization of the field may grant, especially in view of the complexity of different 
policy fields and plurality of actors involved, a picture allowing a simplified but 
comprehensible model. Our aim is not to define how the above-mentioned principles 
ought to apply to executive rulemaking, but to spell out what executive rulemaking 
involves, thereby mapping the terrain where constitutional principles could be brought to 
effective concretisation. 
 
Executive rule making typically involves overlapping—sometimes coincident, sometimes 
asynchronous—phases.72 A typical functional description of such cyclical elements 
within the process of executive rule making is a policy-cycle approach. Such would 
distinguish between, first, agenda setting; secondly, policy formulation; thirdly related 
decision-making and adoption of measures; fourthly implementation including 
monitoring and enforcement which may lead to re-evaluation of a policy and new agenda 
setting. Admittedly, such a cyclical model is a simplification of a complex reality yet it 
appears helpful to lay the basis for de-constructing the rule-making process into its 
archetypical elements. The procedures which might best reflect the realization of 
constitutional values therein may differ from one policy to another. They may also be 
provided for in policy-specific legislation,73 or is, as in many cases, only contained in 
internal rules by the Commission or a specific agency’s management board.74 But 
procedural rules for rule making procedures will in one way or another need to address 
the standard elements of agenda setting, policy formulation and policy adoption at least. 																																																																																																																																																														
agency proposal where the agency was in charge of undertaking the in-depth impact assessment of a proposed 
measure.  
71 H. Hofmann and A. Morini, ‘The Pluralisation of EU Executive—Constitutional Aspects of “Agencification”’, 
(2012) European Law Review, 419-442. 
72 H. Hofmann, G. Rowe and A. Türk, Administrative Law and Policy of the European Union (Oxford University Press, 
2011), at 26. 
73 E.g. Art. 4, 5 of Regulation 881/2004 of the EP and Council on the establishment of a European Railway Agency 
(ERA). 
74 E.g. EASA Management Board Decision 01-2012 amending and replacing Decision 08-2007 concerning the 
procedure to be applied by the agency for the issuing of opinions, certification specifications and guidance material 
(rulemaking procedure) of March 13, 2012. 
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The policy-cycle concept also has the advantage that it allows describing administrative 
activity quite realistically as much more than a mere technical ‘conveyor-belt-style’ 
transposition of value choices undertaken on the legislative level.75 This in turn recalls 
the guiding relevance of basic constitutional principles for the structuring of procedures 
(‘Ordnungsprinzipien des Verfahrensrechts’).76       
 
 
A. Agenda setting 
 
In legal terms, the activities associated with the phase of ‘agenda setting’ might be 
regarded as the definition of a regulatory topic, or an objective of executive rule making. 
It consists of identifying policy objectives and formulating a first set of policy goals to be 
pursued by an act of executive rule making. Agenda setting, in terms of procedural law 
also requires the identification of rights of initiative for a rule-making activity. This may 
differ from one policy area to another.  
 
In terms of the realization of constitutional principles discussed above, the main issues 
regarding agenda setting are the questions of access to information about planned rule 
making activities as pre-condition for the possibility of input from various parties 
potentially interested in or affected by a planned measure.  
 
The right of initiative for adopting a policy has in EU law traditionally been the 
prerogative of the Commission as recipient of delegation of executive powers. Generally, 
such delegating acts empower the Commission to initiate an executive rule making 
process on the basis of its own analysis or an ‘outside’ initiative.77 Agenda setting by the 
Commission is also influenced by Article 12 TEU obliging the Commission to react to a 
successful citizen’s initiative on the proposal of ‘legal acts of the Union’. A citizens’ 
initiative therefore can result in either legislative proposal or a proposal to adopt a non-
legislative act of executive rule making. 
 
Some policy-specific legislation, also introduces the right of agencies to initiate EU rule-
making. In fact, increasingly, policy-specific legislation has entrusted EU agencies or 
networks of national agencies coordinated on the European level with undertaking 
preparatory steps for rule-making. Agencies are free to react to individual’s proposals of 
																																																								
75 H. Hofmann, G. Rowe and A. Türk (n 72 supra), at 26. 
76 This is also a result from lacking legal basis for a common set of procedural rules prior to the entry into force of the 
Treaty of Lisbon which by including Article 298 TFEU has created a legal basis for some overarching rules and 
procedures. Only few aspects of administrative procedures have so far been regulated by EU law in a cross-policy 
fashion. These include comitology, executive agencies, the financial regulation as well as certain aspects of data 
protection (in the EU context) and access to data provisions, the EU language regime, staff matters as well as to a 
certain degree impact assessment rules. 
77 Examples are the implementation of obligations under agreements entered into by the EU under public international 
law such as the various agreements concluded in the context of the WTO hold ample examples for such obligations. 
EU policies (like those of the Member States) are often directly influenced by developments undertaken in contexts of 
public international law. Rule-making, to take some concrete examples, can be influenced by UN security council 
decisions on anti-terror measures. It can also be influenced by obligations arising from the WTO’s TBT or SPS 
agreements, containing obligations of mutual recognition of foreign – non EU – regulatory approaches. 
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doing so.78 An important part of the agenda setting phase is the obligation to develop 
and publish so called ‘work programmes’. The Commission and agencies are subject to 
such obligations arising from policy specific legislation or legislation establishing 
agencies. The Commission is also bound by its own rules of procedure. Programming 
obligations, however, exist predominantly for future formal acts. Rule making procedures 
resulting in internal or non binding acts generally do not contain such obligations. 
 
Key elements at the phase of agenda setting therefore appear to be openness and 
transparency. This may require not just ‘passive’ transparency but also ‘active’ provision 
of information on possible future executive rule making procedures. Such requirements 
of active transparency might also require distribution of information about how to 
propose rule-making initiatives.  Difficulties exist in form of the diversity of executive 
actors and associated problems of ‘systemic’ transparency. It will often be difficult for 
non-experts to discern responsibilities.  
 
 
B. Policy Formulation 
 
The phase of agenda setting is often interwoven with, or followed by, the analysis and 
evaluation of policy alternatives by the institution or body drafting the rules. In terms of 
realizing the constitutional principles discussed in this article, the phase of policy 
formulation is the central moment for undertaking a full and impartial assessment of all 
relevant facts of a decision under the duty of care. Thereby it will be necessary to 
develop tools to ensure that all relevant information is present at the moment of decision 
making so that it can be assessed and interests, rights and values can be weighed in a rule 
making procedure. Such information gathering requirements by the executive actors has 
as mirror-principle, the rights of participation. This is the phase in which interested 
parties need to be able to make their position known in a meaningful and informed 
manner.  
 
Tools for the proceduralisation of the phase of analysis and policy formulation exist in 
the EU. Some policy specific legislation establishes them.79 In other cases they are 
defined in internal administrative guidelines of the Commission or agencies. 
Occasionally, they are also defined in the legislative acts delegating powers. Often, 
procedural provisions devised for this require the analysis of draft rule-making concepts 
by forms of impact assessment procedures, sometimes as cost-benefit analysis with or 
without general notice and comment style procedures for public participation. The need 
for public participation in this phase has led to debates in the legal and political science 																																																								
78 The recent establishment of the European Supervisory Authorities (ESA Directive 2010/78/EU) provides such 
powers in Articles 10 and 15 of the Regulations establishing the European Banking Authority (EBA, Regulation 
1093/2010, [2010] OJ L331/12), the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA, Regulation 1095/2010, 
[2010] OJ L331/84) and the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA, Regulation 
1094/2010, [2010] OJ L331/48). The three supervisory authorities are called not only to adopt preparatory measures, 
but draft regulatory and implementing standards. These standards are preparatory measures to be adopted by the 
Commission under Article 290 and 291 TFEU. 
79 E.g. the obligation of the European Supervisory Authorities to undertake cost benefit analysis and consultation of 
stakeholders by the agencies. 
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literature as to the necessity of an obligation for an impact-assessment inspired 
procedures prior to the publication of a regulatory act.80  Given that the underlying 
rationale for impact-assessment-inspired preparatory procedures is to increase quality 
and thereby legitimacy of rule-making, such benefits might arise in the context of a more 
thorough investigation of the relevant facts and regulatory alternatives of a regulatory 
project.  
 
In any case, however, the details of such approaches require a definition of which 
impact-assessment inspired procedures for executive rule-making would precisely be 
required. They need to clarify inter alia whether they should be but one step of a 
preparatory procedure or whether they should cover all elements of the preparation of an 
act from sourcing of ideas, consultations, seeking scientific expertise to establishing a 
final reasoned draft regulatory act. In order for documentation of the full gathering and 
weighing of relevant information having taken place and in order to provide the political 
and judicial supervision mechanisms of executive actors, the final result of the 
preparation of a rule making procedure requires a reasoned report. This is part of the 
duty to provide reasons and finalizes the fact finding and information gathering phase.  
 
 
C. Adoption of a Rule 
 
These procedural steps generally lead to the Commission formulating a draft rule. This 
can either be adopted formally as a delegated or an implementing act under Articles 290 
or 291 TFEU or it can be another form of adoption of executive rules through 
guidelines, planning documents and others. When agencies are involved in the 
preparation of executive rule-making, as they are in an increasing amount of policy areas, 
their proposals generally require final adoption by the Commission under Articles 290 
and 291 TFEU. The Commission is, however, in many cases not entirely free to accept 
or dismiss an agency proposal. Especially in the most recently regulated policy area, the 
sector of banking and securities supervision, the Commission is subject to procedural 
restrictions. These include requirements to consult with the agency or face procedural 
sanctions such as being called before the EP to explain differences,81 or face longer 
periods of supervision by EP and Council in cases of Article 290 TFEU.82 
 
In the past, one of the main lines of debate about the democratic legitimacy of executive 
rule making was the question how the EP, as directly elected representative of the EU 																																																								
80 See e.g. A. Alemanno, ‘A Meeting of Minds on Impact Assessment: When Ex Ante Evaluation Meets Ex Post 
Judicial Control’, (2011) 17 European Public Law, 485-505. 
81 E.g. under Art 17(2) of the legal basis creating the European Air Safety Agency (EASA) (Regulation No 216/2008, 
[2008] OJ L79/1) or Arts. 10 and 15 of the Regulations establishing the European Banking Authority (EBA, 
Regulation 1093/2010, [2010] OJ L331/12), the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA, Regulation 
1095/2010, [2010] OJ L331/84) and the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA, 
Regulation 1094/2010, [2010] OJ L331/48). 
82 E.g. Art.13(1) of the legal basis of the European Supervisory Authorities (ESA Directive 2010/78/EU) provides 
such powers in Articles 10 and 15 of the Regulations establishing the European Banking Authority (EBA, Regulation 
1093/2010, [2010] OJ L331/12), the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA, Regulation 1095/2010, 
[2010] OJ L331/84) and the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA, Regulation 
1094/2010, [2010] OJ L331/48). 
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citizens could influence the procedure.83 By contrast to the EP’s rights to participation in 
acts of legislative nature (those based directly on Treaty provisions as legal basis) which 
were famously strengthened gradually since the SEA in 1986, the EP had a much more 
difficult time in establishing the notions of participation with regard to delegated rule 
making powers. The Commission had been made subject to supervision and advice from 
comitology committees by the Council since the early years of the Community. But the 
comitology decisions which were adopted in the wake of the entry into force of the SEA, 
the decisions of 1987 and 1999 as well as the amendment of 2006 only gave the EP 
marginal rights of supervision and information. The same holds true for the comitology 
regulation of 2011 which is based on the new Article 291 TFEU. By contrast, the EP has 
significantly gained powers regarding the supervision of Commission’s adoptions of 
delegated acts when it received powers to adopt these under Article 290 TFEU. 
 
But this article has argued that the realization of the fundamental principles of 
democracy go beyond the notion of parliamentary involvement into executive rule 
making. This poses interesting questions regarding the validity of previous direct 
involvement of interested parties. Since the final decision-making procedures are related 
to constitutionally mandated procedures, the notion of participation and direct 
involvement is balanced at this stage with those of representative democracy through the 
EP, the Council and Member State experts in the comitology committees. This balancing 
of direct representation and indirect representation reflects the two approaches 
formulated in Article 11 TEU. 
 
In other cases, the result of a rule making procedure might be the publication of a plan 
(e.g. in the areas of environmental law, regional planning, infrastructures, state aids etc.) 
or a guideline which predominantly has internally binding force. Here, formal adoption 
procedures are rare. The relevance of the principles of transparency and openness, 
however, would require that these acts be published. Publication, under general 
principles of law such as the protection of legitimate expectations and equal treatment, 
may have in itself further legal consequences. These consequences, however, are the 
expression of the Union being a legal system governed by the rule of law and protecting 
individual rights. 
 
 
VII Beyond this special issue : a research agenda 
 
The argument made in this article requires further research on ways to infuse EU 
rulemaking with (specific) constitutional values (principles). It raises several questions 
that, at this stage, remain unanswered. Could the constitutionalisation of executive rule 
making procedure be part of a nascent EU administrative procedure law on rule-making? 
What should the understanding of the democracy principle as formulated primarily in 																																																								
83 See e.g. the discussion in A. Töller, H. Hofmann, ‘Democracy and the Reform of Comitology’, in: M. Andenas, A. 
Türk (eds), Delegated Legislation and the Role of Committees in the EU (Kluwer, 2000), 25-50 with further references.  
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Articles 9-12 TEU be with regard to administrative justice? What would the implications 
be with regard to executive rulemaking? Would a general EU law on administrative 
procedures which would include rule making procedures be capable of contributing to 
the ‘constitutionalisation’ of administrative law? What could be done to strengthen the 
principles of participatory democracy, transparency and openness? Which risks to 
efficient rulemaking do they effectively entail? What should the differences, if any, be for 
the establishment of directly binding versus only indirectly binding (‘soft’) acts be in 
terms of proceduralisation? 
 
This special issue only establishes the very first building blocks of the constitutional 
understanding of executive rulemaking procedures. The contributions to this special 
issue cannot of course cover the entire spectrum of questions raised. They nevertheless 
in our view constitute important building blocks for our future research agenda and  
shed illuminating light on a number of important  underlying issues. In particular, what 
they collectively reveal is that, despite the diversity and differences amongst policy areas 
of the preparatory steps leading to executive rule-making, some basic elements of rule-
making procedures seem to be reappearing in various policy areas. 
 
Joana Mendes discusses the contents of Articles 290 and 291 TFEU in the light of the 
principles of participation and transparency. She argues that the debate on the 
proceduralization of delegated and implementing acts cannot be reduced to an internal 
dimension where the relative powers of the institutions and the Member States are 
defined. The contribution by Thomas Christiansen and Mathias Dobbels is relevant in 
this context discussing to a greater degree the current developments and fault-lines of 
inter-institutional dispute regarding these supervisory tools and the intricacies of 
supervision. Linda Senden looks at the ‘dark matter’ of executive rule making beyond the 
formal provisions of the Treaties– the field often referred to as soft law, despite the fact 
that what is called soft might have some very sharp edges in reality. She in particular 
looks at the emerging practice of post legislative guidelines from the perspective of 
transparency and participation. Alberto Alemanno and Anne Meuwese discuss a different 
aspect of the progressive proceduralization of executive rulemaking: the use of impact 
assessment in delegated rulemaking. They analyse how the tool of impact assessment has 
standardized elements that – if well employed – could be at the service of the realization 
of openness and control over the exercise of delegated rulemaking. 
 
Details of the various steps of agency activity in the field of executive rule making are 
analysed in depth in  the contribution of Edoardo Chiti. Chiti shows in his contribution 
that despite the lack of a common procedural framework almost all agencies active in the 
adoption of executive rules follow procedures that include participation and have a 
normative concern for transparency. At the same time, agencies tend to resort to soft 
law, which is under-proceduralised in both respects. The contribution of Madalina 
Busuioc explores specifically the case study of the European financial supervisory 
authorities as probably the most far-reaching case of agency involvement in executive 
rule-making procedures. Alexander Türk’s paper finally focuses on the important issue of 
judicial review. He explains the (rather limited) contribution the Court makes to setting 
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procedural and substantive standards for EU administrative rulemaking; the liberalisation 
of the standing rules in the Treaty of Lisbon will expose this gap even more.  
 
 
 
